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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much is expected of the modern corporation.  Shareholders seeking to 
maximize their return on investment pay close attention to reported 
earnings and stock price appreciation.1  Unanticipated negative movements 
in these variables can give rise to shareholder agitation, amplified by hedge 
funds and activist pension funds.2  Although this is characteristic of the 
Anglo-American ‘market for corporate control,’ these types of pressures 
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 1. See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 13 (2005) (“CFOs state that earnings are the most 
important financial metric to external constituents.”). 
 2. See TESSA HEBB, NO SMALL CHANGE:  PENSION FUNDS AND CORPORATE 
ENGAGEMENT 1-2 (2008) (discussing the role of pension funds and institutional investors). 
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have also been brought to bear on large continental European companies 
even though nation-state rules and regulations governing stakeholders’ 
relationships have been slow to embrace shareholder rights.3  The 
European Union (hereinafter “EU”) has sought to modernize member 
states’ corporate law, responding, in part, to the reliance of member states 
on domiciled companies for long-term economic growth in the face of 
heightened global competition for market position and the integration of 
financial markets. 
Community activists and some types of institutional investors have 
encouraged traded firms to respond to global challenges such as climate 
change and the welfare of employees and service providers in distant 
lands.4  For many activists these issues are about ethics and moral 
responsibility, given the enormous power of large corporations when 
compared to the majority of national governments.  For some institutional 
investors, especially those with legal obligations regarding the long-term 
welfare of beneficiaries, short-term shareholder value is balanced against 
the long-term growth and development of whole economies.5  In these 
cases, fiduciaries are self-conscious about the time horizon over which they 
reap value from investment; even if not intended, the largest of institutional 
investors have a stake in the long-term structure and performance of global 
markets.6 
Whether corporations have any obligation other than making a 
profit—the limit of corporate social responsibility associated with Milton 
Friedman’s dictum proclaimed at the height of the Cold War—is subject to 
considerable debate.7  For much of continental Europe, the corporation is 
 3. See Rob Bauer et al., The Emerging Market for European Corporate Governance:  
The Relationship Between Governance and Capital Expenditures, 1997-2005, 8 J. ECON. 
GEOGRAPHY 441, 463 (2008) (“[P]ortfolio investors are able to exert pressure on the 
managers of large [European] firms to act in ways consistent with shareholder value rather 
than stakeholder value . . . .”). 
 4. See Gordon L. Clark & Tessa Hebb, Why Should They Care?  The Role of 
Institutional Investors for Corporate Global Responsibility, 37 ENVTL. PLAN. 2015, 2028 
(2005) (showing how institutional investors may encourage companies to adopt higher 
environmental standards). 
 5. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder 
Socially Responsible Investment?, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 145, 145-69 (2007) 
(examining and questioning the existence of the apparent dichotomy between fiduciary 
responsibility and socially responsible investment). 
 6. See JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY 
CAPITALISM:  HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE 
DEMOCRATIC 52-58 (2000) (discussing the emergence of fiduciary capitalism as institutional 
investors take large ownership interests in equity markets). 
 7. See, e.g., Gordon L. Clark et al., Social and Environmental Shareholder Activism in 
the Public Spotlight:  US Corporate Annual Meetings, Campaign Strategies, and 
Environmental Performance, 2001–04, 40 ENV’T & PLAN. 1370, 1371 (2008) (observing 
that “the business of business is business”). 
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foremost a social institution and is treated as such in corporate law.8  In 
many jurisdictions, the formal purpose of the corporation references the 
‘social good,’ albeit in a variety of guises, often stating an explicit 
commitment to community welfare and economic value.  Even in the 
Anglo-American world, companies seeking social kudos often proclaim 
commitment to community norms and expectations.  Managing public 
expectations goes well beyond managing investor expectations, a fact-of-
life recognized as such by non-governmental organizations (hereinafter 
“NGOs”) and community groups at the interface between media and 
markets.9  Mobilizing public confidence in corporate responsibility while 
remaining duty-bound by statutory obligations to shareholder value is a 
challenging task.10 
The issue of corporate responsibility has four distinct dimensions:  
social expectations, investor expectations (short-term and long-term), 
governmental expectations (statute and regulations), and theoretical-cum-
academic expectations.  We should take care not to discount the 
significance of any of these expectations, least of all the theoretical or “in-
principle” expectations of the academic community.11  These expectations 
can be important, given that the debate about the relative value of national 
models of corporate governance in global financial markets will have far-
reaching consequences for the nature and scope of standards adopted by 
supra-national legislative entities such as the EU and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB).12  The genesis of the UK Companies 
Act 2006 (hereinafter “the Companies Act”) is linked to Directive 
2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 
2003 (hereinafter “the EU Modernization Directive”), as well as deeply-
entrenched domestic conceptions of the proper responsibilities of corporate 
 8. See KLAUS J HOPT, Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES:  CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY § 3.1 (Joseph A 
McCahery et al. eds., 2002) (describing the public interesting German corporations). 
 9. See Pratima Bansal & Iain Clelland, Talking Trash:  Legitimacy, Impression 
Management, and Unsystematic Risk in the Context of the Natural Environment, 47 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 93, 101 (2004) (arguing that managers can increase a firm’s environmental 
legitimacy by “minimiz[ing] negative media reports”). 
 10. See Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, 
For Law:  The New Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY:  
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 9 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007) 
(describing the broad range of issues encompassed by corporate social responsibility). 
 11. See Christine Parker, Meta-regulation:  Legal Accountability for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 10, at 236-7 (arguing 
for the meta-regulatory potential of law). 
 12. See RONALD J. GILSON, Globalizing Corporate Governance:  Convergence of Form 
or Function, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 129-130 
(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004) (discussing the relative value of national 
models of corporate governance). 
  
262 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:2 
 
 
officers.13  Understanding corporate responsibility, as embedded in the 
Companies Act, requires an appreciation of the interests of those 
stakeholders who sought to influence the conception and implementation of 
the Act. 
Our paper has three goals.  First, we show that the Companies Act is, 
in part, an expression of the EU modernization project, amplified by the 
UK Labor government (hereinafter “the Government”) to further the global 
status of the UK as a leading standard-setting jurisdiction.  Second, we 
suggest that the Companies Act can be seen as an expression of 
conventional microeconomic theoretical expectations with regard to the 
proper roles and responsibilities of corporate officers rather than an 
expression of conventional corporate social responsibility (hereinafter 
“CSR”) discourse.14  By conventional CSR discourse we mean a theory of 
the firm in which the firm has a responsibility to external stakeholders 
(whether social, environmental, ethical or otherwise).  Third, we argue that 
the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act are entirely consistent 
with Anglo-American investor expectations with regard to the premium on 
the free-flow of market-sensitive data.  While disclosure requirements seem 
to match the expectations of many social activists, especially regarding 
firms’ long-term environmental liabilities, the motivating logic of such 
disclosure has more to do with the market pricing of corporate value than 
expansion of the scope of corporate social responsibility.   
Indeed the current global credit crisis, which has its origins in 
widespread defaults on subprime mortgage loans in the United States, is an 
example where the lack of transparency in financial markets resulted in 
asymmetric information and the mis-pricing of the real risk behind traded 
mortgage-backed derivatives.15  Whatever the nature and scope of 
disclosure, care should be taken not to exaggerate the commitment of 
institutional investors to disclosure regulation for ethical reasons as 
opposed to an interest in the more accurate determination of asset pricing.  
 13. See The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (Eng.); EUR. PARL. & COUNCIL, Directive 
2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, June 18 2003, Amending 
Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the Annual and 
Consolidated Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions and Insurance Undertakings.  This Directive was passed by both Parliament and 
the Council as required under the co-decision procedure.  We understand from 
conversations with Cynthia A. Williams and industry sources that the UK Government was 
unaware of the EU Modernization Directive during its company law reform process, but 
added language to incorporate the EU process when they belatedly recognized that a parallel 
process was going on in Europe.  However, we have not been able to verify this was the 
case. 
 14. See MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM:  GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (2000). 
15. See James L. Bicksler, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Its Linkages to 
Corporate Governance, 5 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE AND GOVERNANCE, 295, 295-96 (2008). 
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In conclusion, we distinguish between the demand and supply of disclosure 
and the interests of public and private pension funds. 
In these ways, we challenge those who argue that the Companies Act 
is a major step forward in defining the nature and scope of corporate 
responsibility.  We concede that it is important, but argue that its 
importance is to be found in its commitment to improving information 
disclosure relevant to market pricing.  By our assessment, the Government 
was able to marry together otherwise competing expectations of social 
activists and investors in a model of disclosure that is quite innovative 
because it fitted well into information-dependent theories of financial 
market performance.16  Equally, the Government was able to use this 
template to tame more radical amendments for disclosure on environmental 
footprints and global supplier-network conditions.  Whether the form of 
disclosure on these issues will be effective depends, in part, on the degree 
to which institutional investors are willing to act on the information.  Some 
may, but we suggest that many of the largest private pension funds will not 
because of conflicts of interest inherent in these types of institutions. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATION 
AND FINANCE SECTOR 
A. Modern Capitalism 
In his treatment of post-war economic structure and performance, 
Shonfield marveled at the rate of growth in U.K. employment and income 
over the previous twenty years.17  By his account, the chronic instability 
and poor performance of the U.K. economy through the inter-war years had 
been solved by the existence of built-in economic stabilizers and Keynesian 
control over the business cycle.18  Some forty years ago, Shonfield argued 
that the conflict over consumption and investment, which had bedevilled 
the first half of the twentieth century, would be resolved through the 
judicious use of national planning (especially regarding education and 
training), economic management, the welfare state, and the regulation of 
the large enterprises that dominated the economy.  As for long-term 
growth, Shonfield suggested that many enterprises were of sufficient 
economic size to mobilize the internal resources necessary to invest in the 
 16. See WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR. & JOSEPH D. DOWNING, INFORMATION MARKETS:  
WHAT BUSINESSES CAN LEARN FROM FINANCIAL INNOVATION 11-16 (2001) (presenting an 
information-based analysis of financial markets). 
 17. ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM:  THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE POWER 4 (1965). 
 18. Id. at 17. 
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next wave of innovation.19 
Shonfield’s treatise was matched in the U.S. by Galbraith’s The New 
Industrial State.20  Both writers were transfixed by the emerging 
“partnership” between the nation-state and the modern corporation, 
suggesting that the bureaucratic management of markets and incomes were 
to their mutual advantage.  Elsewhere, Clark develops these claims about 
the symbiosis between the nation-state and the corporation for Anglo-
American economies in the years leading up to about 1973, emphasizing 
their implications for the management of labor resources and the 
consequent growth of private pension systems.21  The golden era of growth 
was dominated by large industrial corporations, relatively high levels of 
unionization, and growing real incomes.  It was also an era in which 
corporations held their assets as physical plant and equipment, market 
incumbency being the basis for long-term investment.  Shonfield concluded 
that the “modern private enterprise” viewed itself as a “permanent 
institution.”22 
Shonfield and Galbraith wrote of a mode of accumulation at its peak.  
Through the 1970s, the U.K. experienced high levels of unemployment, 
slowing growth in real income, and rapid de-industrialization as private 
institutions faced the full force of international competition for market 
share.  While U.S. industry was not to face these competitive pressures 
until the 1980s, by the early 1990s Jensen argued that the U.S. industrial 
corporation had proven unable to respond effectively to growing market 
competition because of management entrenchment and an imperfect market 
for corporate control.23  Coming out of the 1980s, the U.K. economy had 
entered a new phase of accumulation where real incomes were now driven 
by employment in service industries and London’s pivotal role in the 
emerging global financial industry.24  By the end of the 1990s, the U.S. 
economy had also been transformed, albeit with greater income disparity 
and the remarkable persistence of a number of enormous industrial firms 
that refused to die.25 
 19. Id. at 363. 
 20. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). 
 21. Gordon L. Clark, Re-writing Pension Fund Capitalism 1:  The Modern Corporation 
and Pension Benefit Systems in a World of Perpetual Motion (Oxford Univ. Sch. Geography 
& Env., Working Paper No. 05-08, 2005). 
 22. SHONFIELD, supra note 17, at 376-77. 
 23. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of 
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 850-62 (1993). 
 24. See GORDON L. CLARK, EUROPEAN PENSIONS & GLOBAL FINANCE 170-92 (2003) 
(explaining London’s prominent role in the world’s financial services industries). 
 25. See Ashby H. Monk, The Knot of Contracts:  The Corporate Geography of Legacy 
Costs, 84 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 221, 228-29 (2008) (arguing that a modern economy is 
uncompetitive if its labor force consists largely of unskilled workers, but that many 
American firms resist change because of anticipated transition costs, both to the firm and to 
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Our point in rehearsing the recent history of the U.K. and U.S. is to 
stress that, not so long ago, the modern corporation was a power in the 
land.  It dominated domestic markets, controlled its financial destiny, and 
was an equal partner with the nation-state in fostering the growth and 
development of its home-market.  The modern corporation and its 
associated unions could often negotiate their shares of revenue (retained 
earnings and wages) to their mutual benefit, leaving the residual to be paid 
as dividends to shareholders. 
Three forces conspired to undercut the power of the modern 
corporation.26  First, the liberalization of product markets through the 
European Economic Community (followed by the EU) effectively pitted 
U.K. industry against its nearest-neighbours.  Notwithstanding the costs of 
competition, British firms resisted competition in part because of much 
lower rates of productivity growth and technological innovation compared 
to robust European national champions.  Slow rates of growth turned into 
profound economic crisis.  These competitive forces found in the 
momentum associated with twenty-first global economic integration, now 
threaten continental Europe.  Second, as industry in the UK failed under the 
weight of this resistance, the nation-state came to realize that the post-war 
“partnership” could no longer be relied upon to deliver employment and 
rising living standards.  This political calculus effectively discounted hide-
bound class alliances, replacing the partnership with a more distant 
relationship such that the corporation was increasingly seen as a means to 
an end.27  The nation-state invigorated the market for corporate control so 
as to sustain the growth of national income (if not the interests of corporate 
elites). 
The fledgling financial services industry fueled the transformation of 
British industry, the economy and society.  Underpinned by the reserves of 
established banks and insurance companies, the assets of public and private 
funded pension systems created in the aftermath of the Second World War 
flooded into London.  Thatcher’s “Big Bang” liberalized London’s 
markets, providing domestic savings with a global platform for portfolio 
investment around the world.  Intended or not, the “Big Bang,” combined 
with burgeoning market liquidity, gave the London market a significant 
“first-mover” advantage over continental rivals, reinforced by the in-flow 
from American investment houses followed by the acceleration of global 
financial integration from the mid-1990s.  Third, pension funds and 
individuals). 
 26. Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 55 J. FIN. 1623, 1642-43 (2000). 
 27. See Kevin Campbell & Douglas Vick, Disclosure Law and the Market for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 10, 
at 243-44 (analyzing the expansion of corporate social responsibility accountability fostered 
by the United Kingdom's new legal disclosure strategy). 
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institutional investors swamped the internal resources of corporations, 
driving a wedge between the generation of earned income and the financing 
of corporate strategy and investment.  As foreign banks came to London for 
a global and European location, the cozy alliances of the past were 
fractured. 
Unlike much of continental Europe, the Anglo-American financial 
sector has grown separately from industry and the state.  Because of the 
trust institution, the application of fiduciary duty as the governing ethic, 
and the legal separation of asset management from pension plan sponsors’ 
treasuries, it is arguable that plan sponsors, being the origin of pension 
assets, are also, paradoxically, the object of financial institutions’ 
investment strategies.28  Given the goal of maximizing the portfolio risk-
adjusted rate of return, the average traded firm has been forced into a 
corner:  being just one stock in large diversified portfolios, it is neither held 
nor traded on its particular merits nor is its management necessarily held to 
account for poor performance.  It is all about the short-term pricing of 
stocks given the flow of information about actual and expected earnings 
and market capitalization.  Automated trading systems cued to changes in 
stock market pricing and linked to stock market indices dominate daily 
trading volume.29 
The modern corporation has become the traded object of global 
financial markets and, in some cases, deliberately so.30  Not surprisingly, 
the demand for information on its structure and performance has come to 
dominate debate over the proper substance of company law, pitting national 
traditions against the logic of global financial market integration.31 
B. Institutional Investors, Markets, and Disclosure 
We have suggested that the growth of retirement savings in 
institutions held at arms-length from the immediate interests of sponsoring 
companies altered the balance of power in financial markets in favor of 
 28. See Gordon L. Clark & Tessa Hebb, Pension Fund Corporate Engagement:  The 
Fifth Stage of Capitalism, 59 INDUS. REL. 142, 142 (2004) (arguing that pension funds 
aggregate the disbursed ownership of beneficiaries and can therefore act as unified entities 
with a single voice to engage companies). 
 29. See E. PHILIP DAVIS & BENN STEIL, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 347 (2001) 
(describing automation in institutional trading). 
 30. See GORDON L. CLARK & DARIUSZ WOJICK, THE GEOGRAPHY OF FINANCE:  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 133 (2007) (researching the 
demand for cross-listing of publicly listed firms). 
 31. See Susan Strange, The Future of Global Capitalism; Or, Will Divergence Persist 
Forever?, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN CAPITALISM:  MAPPING CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERGENCE 182, 184-85 (Colin Crouch & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1997) (introducing 
analysis of whether more integration of world markets lends itself to greater convergence of 
world economy). 
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third-party investors.  Elsewhere, the nature and significance of this 
transformation for the structure of Anglo-American financial markets is 
described in detail and is referred to by Clark and Hebb as the “fifth stage 
of capitalism.”32  This develops Robert Clark’s 1981 account of the 
historical evolution of management theories over two centuries.33  As 
pension and retirement savings accumulated over the second half of the 
twentieth century, a revolution was taking place in the investment of those 
assets, accentuating the growing separation between traded companies and 
institutional investors and their market intermediaries.34  This conceptual 
and analytical revolution has arguably remade the structure and 
performance of global financial markets in its image.35 
As is well-appreciated, even in crisis the vast majority of pension 
funds, mutual funds insurance companies, and endowments abide by the 
principles of modern portfolio theory (hereinafter “MPT”).36  In brief, these 
principles are as follows:  (1) there is a correlation between risk and return 
such that investment can be assessed in accordance with expected risk-
adjusted rates of return; (2) investment strategy is about managing portfolio 
risk such that any particular investment and its associated risk and return 
characteristics should be judged against investors’ overall objectives; and 
(3) markets are so efficient that active investing—picking winning stocks 
over losing stocks—is not a viable long-term investment strategy.  MPT 
provides a rationale for holding large swaths of whole markets and treating 
particular stocks as components in a comprehensive strategy of investment 
management.  Given the costs of active management and the unlikely 
prospect of being able to formulate a consistent winning strategy, passive 
portfolio investment is the operative strategy.37 
 32. See Clark & Hebb, supra note 28, at 143. 
 33. See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism:  Reflections on 
Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 562 (1981) (arguing that the 
history of capitalism is composed of four stages, each of which presented problems 
demanding a specific legal framework to address them). 
 34. See MICHAEL J. CLOWES, THE MONEY FLOOD:  HOW PENSION FUNDS 
REVOLUTIONIZED INVESTING 1-18 (2000). 
 35. See generally DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA:  HOW FINANCIAL 
MODELS SHAPE MARKETS (2006) (describing modern portfolio theory). 
 36. See JOHN Y. CAMPBELL & LUIS M. VICEIRA, STRATEGIC ASSET ALLOCATION:  
PORTFOLIO CHOICE FOR LONG TERM INVESTORS 222-24 (2002) (providing an analysis of how 
an individual investor would best allocate wealth into broad asset classes over a lifetime 
under a number of different variables). 
 37. See BOB LITTERMAN & GOLDMAN SACHS ASSET MANAGEMENT QUANTITATIVE 
RESOURCES GROUP, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT:  AN EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 25-
26 (2003).  This is not, of course, the full story.  Recent research in the U.K. and the U.S. on 
the persistence of “winning” traders suggests that a small set of market players are able to 
produce out-performance in a systematic manner by virtue of their buying (but not selling) 
strategies.  This is apparently the case for individuals as well as institutions (although the 
latter are likely to dominate the former).  It is also widely believed that out-performance 
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Systematic out-sourcing of investment management from all but the 
largest of pension funds has accompanied the revolution in financial 
markets (note that mutual funds and insurance companies have, by their 
very nature, tended to internally manage pension and retirement savings).  
There are significant economies of scale in managing the flow of assets 
from contributors to funds to managers and in return to funds and their 
beneficiaries (witness the market dominance of custodial firms like State 
Street Bank of Boston).  Likewise, there are economies of scale in 
executing planned trading strategies that vary by asset class and market 
segment.  Just as importantly, while many investment banks offer a full 
range of investment management services, these firms often claim a 
stronger reputation in one asset class over others (for example, PIMCO in 
bonds but not in equities).  Specialized knowledge and expertise are a 
continuing source of competitive advantage, notwithstanding the claims 
made by bulge-bracket firms for the cost-advantages of complementary 
products.38 
Just as importantly, the accumulated size, complexity, and time-
sensitivity of global financial markets have effectively disenfranchised 
pension fund trustees from direct operational responsibility for investment 
management.  Recognizing this fact, pension fund trustees have been left 
with the responsibility for overall investment strategy, informed, of course, 
by modern portfolio theory.39  Only rarely, and mostly in public pension 
funds, do trustees seek to influence the trajectory of particular stocks. 
This story about the structure and control of investment management 
has been told a number of times.  In recent years, the story has been 
complicated by a loss of confidence in the efficient markets hypothesis, 
which underpins the third MPT principle noted above, the rise and fall of 
hedge funds and alternative asset classes like infrastructure, and the search 
for alpha (a premium on active investment) over beta (the performance of  
whole markets).  The global credit crisis has also undercut the credibility of 
less-than-transparent risk transfer devices such as collateralized debt 
obligations (for example, mortgages).  It is apparent that only the best-
governed funds and institutions focused on risk management and return 
declines as the net inflow of assets to “winning” mutual funds dampens the capacity of those 
entities to sustain their distinctive strategies.  See, e.g., Aneel Keswani & David Stolin, 
Which Money is Smart? Mutual Fund Buys and Sells of Individual and Institutional 
Investors, 63 J. FIN. 85, 85 (2008) (employing a British data set of monthly fund inflows and 
outflows differentiated between individual and institutional investors to argue for a robust 
“smart money” effect in the United Kingdom). 
 38. See CLARK, supra note 24, at 180. 
 39. See Gordon L. Clark & Roger Urwin, Best-Practice Pension Fund Governance, 9 J. 
ASSET MGMT. 2, 6-7 (2008) (“Well-governed trustee boards tend to allocate . . . available 
time and resources to issues like investment strategy and management that may affect the 
long-term integrity of the institution and payment of pension benefits.”). 
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volatility have been effective investors in these arenas.  For all the publicity 
garnered by endowments’ high compound annual rates of return, the 
average public and private pension fund has not been engaged in the 
frontiers of financial innovation nor has it been able to systematically out-
perform asset-specific benchmarks.40 
What should be emphasized at this juncture is the degree to which 
institutional investors rely upon the veracity of market prices and the 
response of financial agents to those prices.  The efficient pricing of stocks 
and bonds, let alone the more exotic financial instruments such as 
collateralized debt obligations is at the very heart of MPT.  Even if the 
efficient markets hypothesis is not a full account of the anomalies and 
biases in market pricing and human behavior, it serves as a normative claim 
on the proper value of quoted prices.41  As such, it is not surprising that 
enormous attention is paid by institutional investors (acting on behalf of 
their pension fund clients) and governments (acting on behalf of the 
welfare of many millions of beneficiaries) to the informational content of 
market prices.  In the end, the mispricing and systematic distortion of asset 
values represents a significant welfare cost to society and, more 
immediately, a constraint on the performance of investment managers (as 
apparent in the subprime credit crisis).  In this respect, the scope of 
“disclosure” of market-relevant information by traded companies and 
related entities has become the litmus test of financial regulation.42 
As the record shows, however, no country has an unblemished record 
in these matters, particularly in relation to the auditing of declared 
corporate assets and liabilities (witness the Enron and WorldCom scandals 
in the U.S.) and the treatment of insider and outsider shareholders as 
regards the timely disclosure of market information (as in much of 
continental Europe).43  La Porta et al. demonstrate the existence of very 
different national traditions as regards corporate disclosure policies and the 
variable significance attributed to global portfolio investors over 
entrenched domestic interests.44  Apparent differences between countries’ 
 40. See Josh Lerner et al., Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices:  The Limited Partner 
Performance Puzzle, 62 J. FIN. 731, 742 (2007) (documenting large heterogeneity in the 
performance of investor classes). 
 41. See Gur Huberman, Behavioural Finance and Markets, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 1-15 (Nicola Dimitri et al. eds., 2003). 
 42. See Tessa Hebb, The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy:  Pension Fund Investors’ 
Corporate Transparency Concerns, 63 J. BUS. ETHICS 385, 391 (2006) (reporting a shift to 
“corporate governance campaigns aimed at raising information within the firm”). 
 43. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?:  The Impact of Cross-Listings 
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1757, 1780-81 (2002) (discussing the fuller disclosure requirements of a U.S. stock 
exchange.).  For the European comparison see supra note 31. 
 44. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 
1149 (1997) (showing that civil law countries have “the weakest investor protections and 
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disclosure regimes have prompted some of the world’s largest pension 
funds to agitate for reform either directly through the lobbying of 
governments or through the leverage applied by the differential investment 
of their own assets by company and country.45  As such, some of the 
world’s largest pension funds have been identified as important innovators 
in their own right, assuming the responsibilities and obligations of 
“universal owners.”46 
In this context, the election of the UK Labor government in 1997 and 
the booming securities markets in the run-up to 9/11 seemed to offer a 
chance for social activists to mobilize the power of institutional investors.  
As part of a larger debate over the prospects for a U.K. stakeholder society 
and the lessons to be learned about CSR from continental European social 
democracies, the Labor government was lobbied to make good on the 
promise to affect socially responsible investment.47  In 1999 the 
Government issued changes in regulations, the Occupational Pension 
Schemes (Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy, etc.) 
Amendment Regulations, under the Pensions Act 1995 wherein trustees of 
occupational (and thereafter local government pension funds) were 
required to disclose in a written statement of investment principles the 
following:  (a) “the extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or 
ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and 
realization of investments”; and (b) “their policy (if any) in relation to the 
exercise of the rights (including voting rights) attached to investments.”48  
For all the critical comment that has accompanied this regulation, there are 
three reasons why its impact has proven to be rather limited.49  Most 
least developed capital markets”).  While the problems of management entrenchment and 
the influence of insiders over outsiders are often discussed with reference to continental 
Europe, it is apparent that some analysts of corporate governance would dispute the 
presumption in favor of U.S. standards of corporate governance.  See, e.g., Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 843-850 
(2005) (analyzing the costs of management entrenchment in the U.S. and the improper 
limits imposed on institutional investors in exercising their “ownership” rights). 
 45. See Tessa Hebb & Dariusz Wójcik, Global Standards and Emerging Markets:  The 
Institutional Investment Value Chain and CalPERS’ Investment Strategy, 37 ENV’T & PLAN. 
1955, 1971 (2005) (arguing for greater convergence to global standards when key actors in 
the investment value chain demand levels of corporate and social behavior greater than 
those consistent with a country's current regulatory framework). 
 46. HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 22. 
 47. See WILL HUTTON, THE STATE WE'RE IN (1997) (discussing the prospects for a UK 
stakeholder society). 
 48. The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture, 
Bankruptcy etc.) Amendment Regulations 1999, 1999, S.I. 1849, cl. 2(4)(b) (U.K.). 
 49. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish:  
Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 
35-37 (2005) (describing three groups into which beneficiaries who support socially 
responsible investing divide themselves). 
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obviously, the change in regulation pre-supposed corporate disclosure on 
these issues whereas the nature and scope of corporate disclosure were not 
directly affected.  In any event, though hardly recognized at the time, the 
effects of the change in regulation were to fall largely on fund managers 
rather than on pension funds.  Fund managers were reluctant to engage with 
the issues unless directly required by their clients.50  In this respect, the 
regulation did not require institutional investors to take social, 
environmental or ethical considerations into account in their investment 
decisions.  The Government also rejected a proposal by the U.K. Social 
Investment Forum for amendment to the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 to include the provision of environmental investment and related 
lending products within the Financial Services Authority’s mandate.51 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF MANDATORY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF 
NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
A. The EU Modernisation Directive 
The EU Modernisation Directive was a product of the Lisbon Strategy 
of 2000 which sought to build competitive and efficient European financial 
markets.52  The Strategy set 2005 as the deadline by which the European 
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (“FSAP”) of 1999 would be 
implemented.53  The motivating purpose of the FSAP was to “enhance the 
comparability of financial statements prepared by Community companies 
 50. The global finance industry’s lack of responsiveness to social concerns, indeed 
social welfare, is one of the topics explored in JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL 
OF CAPITALISM (2005). 
 51. U.K. Social Investment Forum, “UK Social Investment Forum Tells MPs of Need 
to Include Environment in Framework for Financial Services Regulator” (Press Release, 
April 19, 1999), at www.uksif.org/press/welcome/frameset.shtml; Financial Services and 
Markets Act, 2000.  If limited in scope, the U.K. “reform” did spark legislative initiatives in 
continental Europe and Australia for fund managers to actively consider social, 
environmental and ethical concerns in their investment decisions.  Sweden introduced the 
toughest provisions regarding social and environmental disclosure.  Regulatory reforms in 
January 2001 required Sweden’s five largest state-run pensions to incorporate 
environmental and ethical considerations in their investment strategies as well as report to 
the Government on the implementation of this policy:  “investments activities shall take 
environmental and ethical considerations into account without lowering the overall objective 
of a high return.”  Fjärde AP-fonden (Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund), A 
Presentation of Seden’s New National Pension Funds 4 (2001). 
 52. Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council (March 23-24, 2000), available 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm. 
 53. Commission Communication Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: 
Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 final (May 11, 1999), available at 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24210.htm. 
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whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market.”54  
Regulations which emerged from the FSAP included Regulation (EC) No 
1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 
which introduced the requirement that European-listed companies prepare 
consolidated accounts in accordance with International Accounting 
Standards from 2005 onwards.55  The EU Modernisation Directive sought 
to ensure that annual and consolidated reporting for EU companies was in 
line with best practice, including the reporting of financial and non-
financial information. 
The EU Modernisation Directive was ambitious in its scope, 
amending both annual reporting under Directive 78/660/EC and 
consolidated annual reporting under Directive 83/349/EEC.  It instituted a 
system of reporting whereby companies must provide “at least a fair review 
of the development and performance of the company’s business . . . 
together with the principal risks and uncertainties that it faces.”56  Although 
this did not explicitly refer to environmental, social or governance factors 
of firms, the Directive provided that “where appropriate, non-financial key 
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including 
information relating to environmental and employee matters” shall be 
reported.57 
The EU strategic plan subsequent to the Lisbon Strategy, the Action 
Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance 
in the European Union launched by the European Commission in May 
2003, was one of the points of reference for the UK’s 2005 White Paper on 
Company Law Reform (“White Paper”).58  The White Paper was framed 
around four strategic objectives:  (1) to enhance shareholder engagement 
and a long-term investment culture; (2) to ensure better company regulation 
and a “think small first” approach; (3) to make it easier to set-up and run a 
company in the UK; and (4) to provide greater flexibility for corporate 
reforms in the future.  The White Paper described disclosure reforms as “a 
further major step forward in improving company reporting and 
transparency and in promoting effective dialogue on the key drivers of 
long-term company performance.”59  Heightened disclosure standards were 
driven by a commitment to a more efficient market pricing of traded 
 54. See EU Modernisation Directive, supra note 13 at cl. 1. 
 55. 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1. 
 56. EU Modernisation Directive, supra note 13 at art. 1 cl. 14(a) and art. 2 cl. 10(a). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European 
Union—A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003), at 23; 
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, COMPANY LAW REFORM, 2005, Cm. 6456, available at 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006/white-paper/page22800.html. 
 59. White Paper at 10. 
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companies, implying that stock prices ought to be determined by long-term 
value. 
Unresolved was whether non-financial disclosure had separate status 
or was dependent upon a demonstrable link to stock market pricing.  The 
initial legislative effects of the EU Modernisation Directive and the White 
Paper on greater disclosure of financial and non-financial information came 
through in the 2005 amendments to the UK Companies Act 1985 
(hereafter, OFR Regulations).60  Among the items considered, these 
amendments established the requirement for an Operating and Financial 
Review (“OFR”) for quoted companies.  One motivation behind these 
amendments was the incorporation into U.K. law of the new accounting 
requirements introduced under the EU Modernization Directive.  There 
were, however, other important domestic considerations in the U.K.’s 
purpose and intended effects of these reforms. 
The domestic considerations behind the OFR reforms can be 
elucidated from the Department of Trade and Industry’s “Final Regulatory 
Impact Assessment on the Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ 
Report Regulations.”61  The Department noted that sophisticated financial 
disclosure regime was needed to encourage capital market activity.62  The 
key purpose and intended effect of the OFR was to improve shareholder 
engagement (as opposed to stakeholder engagement), and it was argued 
that clear, meaningful, and reliable information about the main drivers of a 
company’s performance was the best way to encourage shareholders and 
potential investors to exercise effective and responsible control in their 
investment decisions.63  It was also argued that where market asymmetries 
of information were overcome, investors would be more able to invest in 
capital markets with reduced adverse selection and therefore lower liquidity 
risks.64 
Improved transparency through greater access to data on quoted 
companies should place shareholders in a better position to effectively 
protect their interests and control directors’ overreach.65  In addition, 
adopting the “fair review” standard from the EU Modernisation Directive 
would lead to “greater transparency and precision of company reporting on 
 60. The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ Report 
etc.) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 [hereinafter “OFR Regulations”]. 
 61. UK Department of Trade & Industry, Final Regulatory Impact Assessment on the 
Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ Report Regulations, available at 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file21361.pdf. 
 62. Id. at ¶ 5. 
 63. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 9. 
 64. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 65. See Bauer, supra note 3 (noting that “the market for corporate control is 
increasingly important in promoting short -and medium-term shareholder value”). 
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performance on financial and non-financial matters.”66  Environmental 
disclosures were to be elements of non-financial “matters,” acknowledging 
the pressure on businesses to account for the increasingly important 
intangible asset value of a firm based on its brand image and reputation.67  
In this way, although the OFR demonstrated similarities to the EU 
Modernisation Directive by requiring reporting on non-financial matters, 
the OFR’s broader focus on shareholders’ interests and the proper pricing 
of a company’s future financial performance distinguished the OFR from 
continental European notions of stakeholder capitalism in favor of the 
predominant concerns of Anglo-American shareholder capitalism.68 
Indeed, the U.K.’s particular concern for shareholders’ interests may 
explain the more rigorous disclosure provisions in the OFR compared with 
the EU Modernisation Directive.  The EU Modernisation Directive applied 
to large and medium-sized companies without distinguishing between 
quoted and non-quoted companies, and framed its reporting provisions on 
financial and non-financial information generally without specific reference 
to the kind of information which would need to be disclosed nor the 
intended recipients of this information.  However, the government made 
the U.K. position clear by emphasizing that the requirement to disclose 
non-financial information was directed at the interests of shareholders 
rather than stakeholders:  “The Government believes that the shareholder 
base of quoted companies—typically large and diverse—has different and 
additional needs to that of private companies, hence the requirement to 
prepare a more fulsome, and more forward-looking review than that 
required under the [EU Modernisation] Directive.”69  In this sense, the 
UK’s OFR was largely motivated by a conviction that environmental and 
social information had a clear link to stock market pricing and future 
financial performance. 
Although the reasons for the OFR’s broad disclosure of non-financial 
information including, where appropriate, corporate environmental and 
social responsibility (hereafter, CESR) were grounded in conventional 
 66. UK Department of Trade & Industry, supra note 61, at ¶ 13. 
 67. Id. at ¶ 18.  The significance of intangible assets for the modern corporation clearly 
varies by sector, and the history of a corporation.  Methods of discriminating between 
corporations as regards their sensitivity to reputation have been developed, in part, based 
upon proprietary databases.  See, e.g., Gordon L. Clark & James Salo, Corporate 
Governance and Environmental Risk Management:  A Quantitative Analysis of ‘New 
Paradigm’ Firms, in PENSIONS AT WORK:  SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT OF UNION-
BASED PENSION FUNDS 129, (Jack Quarter et al. eds., 2008) (analyzing differing 
management styles in response to growing financial risk). 
 68. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 35 (suggesting that the OFR represented a 
push away from stakeholder capitalism within the U.K., which is contrary to what we 
argue).  Rather, we claim the OFR distinguished itself from what we define as conventional 
CSR because it was ultimately focused on shareholders’ financial interests. 
 69. UK Department of Trade & Industry, supra note 61 at ¶ 14. 
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theories of the firm, they also satisfied NGO interests in corporate social 
responsibility.  As discussed, these provisions directly incorporated the 
requirements for “fair review” reporting of a company’s development, 
performance, or position as set out in the EU Modernisation Directive.  
However, they went further by requiring companies to report on “the main 
trends and factors which are likely to affect that company’s future 
development, performance and position.”70  Additionally, OFR provisions 
gave substance to the EU Modernisation Directive’s requirement for non-
financial reporting on “environmental and employee matters.”71  
Companies were to be required to include information about the 
environment including analyzing the impact of the company on the 
environment.72  As well, companies were required to provide “information 
about social and community issues.”73 
In November of 2005, however, the UK Chancellor abandoned the 
new OFR provisions less than six months after they were introduced 
without consultation with the Department of Trade and Industry, other 
Ministries, or relevant stakeholders.74  The publicly stated reason for 
abandoning these provisions was the administrative costs associated with 
reporting.  The then Chancellor (and now Prime Minister) Gordon Brown 
said:  “I understand the concerns about the extra administrative cost of the 
goldplated regulatory requirement that from April next year all quoted 
companies must publish an operating and financial review.”75 
The policy reversal was not met with universal acclaim by the 
business community.  In any event, as we note below, these provisions 
reappeared in a weaker form in the Company Law Reform Bill (“Reform 
Bill”) which was debated in the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons through 2006 before its passage as the UK Companies Act 
2006.76  Lord Sharman during the Second Reading on the Reform Bill in 
the House of Lords assessed the political and business communities’ 
positions on disclosure in the following terms: 
 70. OFR Regulations, supra note 60 at § 1(d). 
 71. Id. at part 2, § 234ZZB, cl. 3(b). 
 72. Id. at part 9, § 4, cl. 1(a). 
 73. Id. at part 9, § 4, cl. 1(c). 
 74. For example, in anticipation of the adoption of the OPR, the UK Accounting 
Standards Board had published an Exposure Draft in 2005 canvassing the likely scope of 
expected disclosure as well as various measures needed to implement the policy. 
 75. Chancellor Gives ONS Independence, BBC NEWS, Nov. 28, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4477516.stm; see also Cynthia A. Williams & John M. 
Conley, Triumph or Tragedy?  The Curious Path of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the 
U.K., 31 WM & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 327-361 (2007) (offering a more 
detailed discussion on the political story surrounding the UK Government’s policy reversal 
on the OFR.) 
 76. Company Law Reform Bill, 2005, H.L. Bill [34]. 
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[T]he Chancellor’s statement abolishing the OFR simply did not 
earn him the brownie points from the business community that he 
anticipated . . . [i]nvesting bodies like the notion of an OFR and 
the issues that have given rise to concern did not involve whether 
there should be an OFR, but involved some of the data that were 
to be required.77 
B. Passage of the UK Companies Act 2006 
In the Reform Bill, the companies’ obligation to report non-financial 
information as per the OFR was replaced by company directors’ obligation 
to produce an annual business review.78  The Bill abandoned substantial 
provisions which had appeared in the OFR.  First, the Reform Bill dropped 
the requirement for forward-looking reporting on the main trends and 
factors likely to affect the company’s future.  Second, although the business 
review would be required to include information on environmental and 
employee matters where appropriate, social and community issues were 
omitted.79  Furthermore, environmental matters no longer explicitly 
included the impact of the business on the environment, and the 
requirement to disclose a company’s environmental impact assessment 
policies and the success of their implementation was abandoned.  Finally, 
whereas the OFR and the EU Modernisation Directive required businesses 
to report in a manner consistent with their size and complexity, the Reform 
Bill exempted businesses qualifying as “medium-sized” from reporting 
non-financial information.80 
In debates through the House of Commons and House of Lords, 
however, the Government was pressured to reinstate many of the OFR 
provisions which had been removed in the business review section of the 
Reform Bill.  Although there was lobbying from both the NGO and 
business communities, the key reforms which made it into the Bill were 
based on mainstream microeconomic theories of the firm and efficient 
markets vis-à-vis information disclosure, rather than a radical CSR model 
for the U.K. corporation. 
In this respect, the Government’s disclosure regime was consistent 
with Jensen’s theory of the firm.81  An implicit assumption permeating 
debate in the House of Commons and House of Lords was that information 
related to environmental and social matters is crucial for markets to 
accurately evaluate the market prices of firms.  Jensen argued that the firm 
 77. 677 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 194. 
 78. Reform Bill, supra note 76, at § 390, cl. 2. 
 79. Id. at § 390, cl. 4(b). 
 80. Id. at § 390, cl. 7. 
 81. See JENSEN, supra note 14, at 85-87. 
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is a product of the relationship between principals (shareholders) and 
agents (management), and that shareholders and managers do not have the 
same interests.  Consequently, resources (both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary) are expended by both parties to maximize their private interests.  
Shareholders commit “monitoring expenditures” in order to oversee 
directors’ actions and seek to limit activities that harm their interests.82  
Directors, on the other hand, give shareholders appropriate incentives in the 
contracting relationship to deflect suspicion and pay shareholders “bonding 
costs” to guarantee that shareholders will not hinder their activities.83  
Jensen described the total costs which arise from this “unavoidable” 
tension between shareholders and directors as “agency costs.”84  Agency 
costs can be positive and even desirable so long as the benefits to the firm’s 
yield exceed the downside costs. 
In the final version of the Reform Bill, disclosure was deemed 
necessary in order to give effect to the newly codified directors’ duty to act 
in a way which is “most likely to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole.”85  In carrying out this duty, the new 
drafting of Section 172 stated that directors would: 
[H]ave regard (amongst other matters) to: 
(a) the likely  consequences of any decision in the long term; 
. . . 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with 
suppliers, customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operation on the community and 
the environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for 
high standards of business conduct . . .86 
In effect, this provision identified CESR matters as issues to which 
directors would need to turn their mind to in carrying out their duties for 
the benefit of the company.  This is very different from CSR where the 
company is motivated by responsibilities towards external stakeholders. 
In the Grand Committee stage in the House of Lords and throughout 
the passage of the Bill, the issue was whether the duty to promote the 
success of the company was a new duty, which therefore required a change 
in implementation arrangements to support this duty, or whether it simply 
made no difference.  Lord Sharman’s view was that a new duty would be 
formed to push the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate endeavor “to a more 
not quite pluralist society but rather a northern European model where there 
 82. Id. at 86. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, supra note 13, at § 172. 
 86. Id. 
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are a group of stakeholders [that] are involved.”87  This was contested by 
Lord Hodgson who argued that the Bill simply codified common law duties 
and therefore made no substantive difference to the existing legal 
position.88 
Lord Sainsbury, Under-Secretary of State for the Department of Trade 
and Industry, sought to clarify the Government’s position.  Although he 
acknowledged that the Reform Bill would codify common law duties, he 
contended that it would make a substantive difference by identifying 
specific factors which are relevant to the success of the company.89  In this 
way, the codification of directors’ duties could be regarded as a monitoring 
cost imposed on directors so that shareholders and prospective shareholders 
could better assess the risk/return profile of UK firms.  The significance of 
newly codified directors’ duties, then, was not that they materially changed 
the relevance of CESR considerations in terms of the success of the 
company.  Rather, it was that they explicitly acknowledged what had 
previously been taken to be implicit:  the importance of CESR factors in 
protecting shareholders’ interests and the long-term success of the 
company. 
In the House of Commons, a company’s environmental and ethical 
performance was interpreted as a financial value issue by the 
Conservatives, rather than as a purely environmental or conventional CSR 
issue.  Justine Greening MP argued that: 
[A]t the heart of any successful company is an in-depth 
understanding of what its customers want and value.  Perhaps 
more than at any time in the past, customers place a value not just 
on what they are purchasing from companies, but on the way in 
which companies have carried out their business in order to 
provide those products or services.  Companies can therefore be 
at the forefront of the push to tackle environmental and ethical 
issues.90 
She distinguished this financial value-based argument from a purely 
environmental-based case for the disclosure regime saying “[a]s the 
Minister said, company law is not the best vehicle for addressing wider 
social and environmental concerns.  We can address those objectives, as 
some Government Members have said, through domestic legislation, health 
and safety measures and environmental protection, on which progress has 
been made.”91 
Also debated was the need for an auditor’s report to verify the validity 
 87. 679 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 169. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 170. 
 90. 450 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2006) 889. 
 91. Id. at 890. 
  
2009] UK COMPANIES ACT 2006 279 
 
 
of reported information.  Baroness Thorton, in the Grand Committee stage 
of the House of Lords, identified quality assurance of the information as an 
issue which was raised from public consultations on the OFR regulations 
but which was not addressed in the Reform Bill.92  Her concern was echoed 
by Baroness Miller who argued that unaudited information would result in 
the provisions becoming a “marketing bandwagon” for companies to 
promote their alleged “‘ethical,’ ‘sustainable,’ or ‘fair trade’” products and 
services.93  This concern was raised again later in the House of Commons 
where it was argued that much of the information presented by companies 
on environmental and social responsibility is public relations or “green-
wash.”94  The House of Commons’ focus on this issue indicated a specific 
intention to overcome the charge often made of conventional CSR 
discourse as an elaborate form of public relations.95  The auditing of 
corporate reports was therefore central to making the information relevant 
to actual business performance rather than simply another avenue for 
marketing.96 
In the final version of the Companies Act, the provisions regarding the 
auditing of disclosed information remained weak.  The only explicit 
obligation on the auditor is with respect to the directors’ report more 
generally, which includes the business review.  At section 496 of the 
Companies Act, the auditor “must state in his report on the company’s 
annual accounts whether in his opinion the information given in the 
directors’ report for the financial year for which the accounts are prepared 
is consistent with those accounts.”97  There is no requirement to verify the 
validity of the non-financial information itself.  This reflects the 
Government’s eagerness to avoid a “prescriptive” or rules-based approach 
to reporting.  The provisions which do apply to the quality of reporting 
hold directors liable for loss to the company suffered as a result of any 
untrue or misleading statements in the directors’ report.98  Personal liability 
also attaches to directors if they fail to disclose relevant information to the 
company’s auditor or if they fail to take all relevant steps to do so.99 
A related issue which attracted attention in the House of Lords was a 
late amendment to the Reform Bill suggested by the House of Commons on 
October 18, 2006 to require disclosure of “information about persons with 
whom the company has contractual or other arrangements which are 
 92. 679 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 166. 
 93. Id. at 167. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 37-38. 
 96. See Margaret Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global 
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L 325, 326-327 (2008). 
 97. Companies Act 2006, § 496. 
 98. Id. at § 463. 
 99. Id. at § 418. 
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essential to the business of the company.”100  This is particularly relevant to 
companies’ supply chains.  There were two substantive objections to this 
amendment debated by the House of Lords.  First, it was thought by 
Baroness Cohen that disclosure of this information would be detrimental to 
business because of its commercially sensitive nature.101  Second, there was 
a concern expressed by Baroness Noakes that the obligation would be too 
onerous, since it was unclear how much detail companies would need to 
provide so as to comply with the provision.102 
The Government made two clarifications in response to these 
concerns.  The first was to provide an exception to reporting on supply 
chain issues where “disclosure would, in the opinion of the directors, be 
seriously prejudicial to that person and contrary to the public interest.”103  
Secondly, the Government did not intend disclosure to be particularly 
detailed, but to be sufficiently high-leveled so as to give an impression of 
the principal risks and opportunities facing the company. 
While these clarifications were sufficient to win support for the 
amendment, they also highlighted the absence of rules and regulations 
which could serve as benchmarks for the quality and quantity of required 
disclosure.  The omission of such standards reflected the Government’s 
concern not to impose costly reporting obligations on companies, and to 
leave much of the nature of reporting to directors’ discretion.  But, as Lord 
Razzall commented in the final Consideration of Commons Amendments 
in the House of Lords on November 2006: 
[W]e support the NGOs in believing that the Government . . . 
ought to give some indication of what the standard reporting 
practice should be, which they have the power to do by 
regulation.  The whole purpose of this is not only to obtain the 
disclosure of information itself, but also to provide a measure by 
which a number of ethical investors, or those who wish to invest 
within an ethical framework, can obtain comparisons between 
different companies.  It would be difficult for those ethical 
comparisons to be made without some element of standard 
reporting practice which I feel can come only from the 
Government.104 
It was not just the NGOs but also members within the business 
community who were concerned about the lack of a clear reporting 
 100. Id. at § 417, cl. 5(c). 
 101. 686 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 465. 
 102. Id. at 471. 
 103. Id. at 468. 
 104. Id. at 459-60.  This echoed the principal purpose of the EU Modernisation Directive 
which was to generate a common reporting standard so as to allow comparison between 
European traded companies on financial and non-financial measures. 
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standard. 
Ultimately, the disclosure regime promulgated under the final 
Companies Act 2006 incorporated elements of the EU Modernisation 
Directive.  Nonetheless, there were significant differences in form and 
substance.  In Section 417(2) of the Act, directors, not the company, are 
required to compile a business review “to inform members of the company 
and help them assess how the directors have performed their duty under 
section 172 (duty to promote the success of the company).”105  
Furthermore, for the reasons suggested above, the precise scope and scale 
of the business review was more rigorously worded than the EU 
Modernisation Directive, as follows: 
[T]he business review must, to the extent necessary for the 
understanding of the development, performance or position of the 
company’s business, include: 
(a) the main trends and factors likely to affect the future 
development, performance and position of the company’s 
business; and 
(b) information about (i) environmental matters (including the 
impact of the company’s business on the environment), (ii) the 
company’s employees, and (iii) social and community issues, 
including information about any policies of the company in 
relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those policies; 
and 
(c) subject to subsection (11), information about persons with 
whom the company has contractual or other arrangements which 
are essential to the business of the company.106 
IV. THE NEW ROLE OF CESR INFORMATION IN THE FINANCE SECTOR 
A. Disclosure Standards and Financial Intermediation 
As is the case in many areas of European policy making, member 
states are required to adhere to EU Directives unless they have previously 
agreed to exceptions specific to a member state (as for the U.K. in selected 
areas of policy making).  While the EU does lead the U.K. in a variety of 
policy areas, especially as regards employment rights and conditions and 
environmental policy, it is arguable that the roots of the EU Modernisation 
Directive in the Lisbon Strategy (2000) and the commitment to pan-
European integration of financial markets reflected the interest of the 
Government (and the city of London in particular) in a growing market for 
financial services as well as the unfettered flow of portfolio investment to 
 105. Companies Act 2006, § 417, cl. 2. 
 106. Id. at § 417, cl. 5. 
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Europe’s largest traded companies.  In fact, the EU Modernisation 
Directive came to the U.K. policy arena already committed to reinforcing 
U.K. global advantages in corporate governance and the “principles 
approach” over the “rules and regulation” approach to securities 
regulation.107  In this context, the Companies Act can be seen as one 
element in a concerted campaign by the Government to reinforce the 
dominance of London in European financial markets, and the advantages 
enjoyed by London over New York in international financial market 
transactions.108 
As noted above, the Companies Act left company directors 
responsible for disclosing relevant information for business reviews of the 
long-term prospects of their firms.  In doing so, the Act relied on a 
principles-based standard of accounting based on “a fair review of the 
company’s businesses” while referencing the crucial issues to be 
considered.109  It did not provide an explicit definition of the nature and 
scope of proper reporting on those issues.  For some commentators, 
Parliament had neither the time nor the expertise to define the nature and 
scope of the implied reporting standards introduced through the legislation.  
Observers of the legislative campaign in the House of Lords suggest that 
the Commons’ deliberations on the Bill were at best perfunctory, at worst 
uninformed.110  Equally, the Chancellor’s political sensitivity to claims 
 107. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2008) (discussing the recent advantages realized by the 
U.K. with regard to international IPO’s because of its “principles-based” approach to 
securities regulation). 
 108. See Coffee, supra note 43.  Competition between financial centers for global 
position is a vital ingredient in debate over nation-state financial regulation.  See Dariusz 
Wójcik, Geography and the Future of Stock Exchanges:  Between Real and Virtual Space, 
38 GROWTH & CHANGE 200, 218-19 (2007).  In their assessments of the declining 
significance of Wall Street in relation to London both the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation (2007) and the Bloomberg and Schumer report suggested that one cause of this 
decline was to be found in the costs of U.S. securities regulation and especially the U.S. 
preference for detailed rules and regulations over principles.  See generally MICHAEL R. 
BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007).  This issue has re-emerged with the debate over 
the proper U.S. regulatory response to the sub-prime credit crisis; for some, the crisis was 
the result of banks and financial institutions circumventing the rules regarding capital 
adequacy and the like.  By some accounts, a principles approach would have dampened such 
behavior putting the onus on the institutions to show that their investment practices were 
consistent with the intentions of regulators. 
 109. Companies Act 2006, § 417, cl. 3. 
 110. There is a certain irony in the capacity and willingness of the House of Lords to 
engage in the substantive issues of legislation (compared to their colleagues in the 
Commons).  Since being elected in 1997, the Labor Government has sought to establish the 
primacy of the lower House by reforming the Lords.  However, by excluding hereditary 
peers and by the appointment process, the Lords has become a chamber more than able to 
challenge the government of the day.  See generally ANTHONY KING, THE BRITISH 
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about the costs of over-burdening corporate reporting narrowed the nature 
and scope of mandated reporting.  As a consequence and not withstanding 
attention to the environment and employee circumstances in debate over 
passage of the Reform Bill, company directors were deemed responsible 
for determining the weight and significance (if any) to be attributed to these 
issues.  It could be argued, moreover, that the Government pulled back 
from providing explicit rules on CESR disclosure requirements in a manner 
consistent with the principles-based approach to accounting favored in the 
U.K. and EU.  Indeed, in the absence of a principles-based approach it is 
likely that there would be no information disclosure on CESR risks and 
long-term uncertainties facing a company, as is the case in the U.S.  The 
U.S. financial reporting regulation has shied away from the U.K. 
principles-based approach to accounting standards and a fair review 
override in preference to rule-based accounting which provides explicit 
guidance on what companies are required to report.111  In a 2003 U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) report, the SEC considered 
amending this approach in favor of an objectives oriented standard 
approach.112  The Report argued in favor of standards framed in terms of an 
accounting objective “at an appropriate level of specificity” with “an 
appropriate amount of implementation guidance.”113  This debate remains 
unresolved in the U.S.  Indeed, the reluctance of the SEC and Financial 
Accounting Standards Board to implement principles-based accounting 
standards may account for the lack of CESR reporting in the US, and will 
continue until clearer financial metrics are developed to analyze CESR 
information. 
As a consequence, firms specializing in legal services, accounting and 
audit functions, and directors’ training and compliance have entered the 
market to provide advice on reporting according to the Companies Act and 
its provisions.  Service companies have relied, in part, upon professional 
bodies to supply guidelines on compliance in the absence of detailed 
Government rules and regulations and legal precedents that might provide 
authoritative interpretations.  Similarly, a range of NGOs have come to the 
burgeoning market for corporate advice and third-party certification, 
moving from public opinion with respect to the proper scope of CESR to 
providing fee-based advisory services.  Not surprisingly, the larger 
advisory companies have employed CESR specialists from the NGO sector 
CONSTITUTION (2007) (noting the recent history of British constitutional life). 
 111. See David Alexander, Globalisation of Accounting Standards:  A UK Perspective, 
in GLOBALISATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 58-61 (Jayne M. Godfrey & Keryn 
Chalmers eds, 2007). 
 112. SEC, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the 
Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting 
System (2003). 
 113. Id. at Executive Summary. 
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and universities just as many of the larger FTSE-listed corporations have 
come to employ in-house CESR specialists with responsibility to build the 
information databases consistent with directors’ newfound disclosure 
obligations.  Armed with CESR information, disclosure has become, an 
important element of corporations’ reputation management programs in the 
media and elsewhere.114 
Notwithstanding the boost to fee-based advisory services brought by 
the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act, it would seem that 
directors’ compliance with the Act may remain specific to each company 
until ‘best-practice’ standards of reporting are established.  By contrast, 
institutional investors demand standardized disclosure of market-sensitive 
information such that data are comparable between companies (especially 
those in the same industries and countries), consistent in definition and 
measurement over time, and comprehensive in nature and scope.  Further, 
with the importance of real-time data providers such as Bloomberg, 
Reuters, and Thomson it is also apparent that institutional investors demand 
immediate access to this type of data directly from trading desks.  Data-
mining and the stress-testing of causal relationships with regard to 
corporate characteristics and stock-price movements have become essential 
to investment practice, whatever the past significance attributed to the 
efficient markets hypothesis.115  See, for example, the success of the 
Gompers et al. test and its variants on the significance of companies’ 
quality of corporate governance for stock value.116 
Absent U.K. government rules and regulations governing the 
disclosure of market-sensitive data on the long-term prospects of 
companies, market intermediaries have sought to supply standards and 
data.  One of the most important providers of disclosure standards with 
respect to corporate balance sheets and the related data that flows through 
global financial markets is the London-based International Accounting 
Standards Board (“IASB”).  However, the IASB has lagged behind EU and 
U.K. legislation on developing standards and metrics for these types of 
issues.117  Independent of government and based upon independent 
 114. See Clark & Hebb, supra note 4, at 2023-24 (discussing the importance of 
disclosure in maintaining, or disrupting, a corporation’s reputation). 
 115. See Gordon L. Clark et al., Institutional Investors and the Language of Finance:  
The Global Metrics of Market Performance, in GLOBALISATION OF ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS, supra note 111, at 15 (discussing global harmonization of language used in 
global accounting standards). 
 116. Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 
107, 144-145 (2003). 
 117. Note, however, that the U.K. Accounting Standards Board (2006) has sought to 
influence the reporting of items subject to the “business review” sections of the Companies 
Act with a set of recommendations reflecting what they contend to be “best-practice.”  
Lacking statutory force, as was to be the case through the OFR, these recommendations 
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expertise, the IASB is responsible for formulating and articulating 
corporate reporting standards consistent with the effective flow of market-
sensitive information to global financial markets.  Presumably, if the IASB 
were to introduce related standards it would neither allow directors’ 
discretion as to the significance attributed to such standards, nor would it 
allow directors the option to select “relevant” data or information.  The 
IASB, like other accounting standard boards around the world, mandates 
both the use of promulgated standards and the nature and scope of 
information to be disclosed.118 
In the space provided by the Companies Act, and the lack of 
engagement on these issues by the accounting standards boards, 
intermediaries have come to market with their own “standards” and 
products to match.  As such, the absence of standard-setting by the 
Government on this issue is arguably a deliberate experiment in market-
volunteerism.  It is an attempt to let market agents digest the large volume 
of financial and non-financial information entering the marketplace so that 
it might pre-empt what CESR issues are regarded as important drivers for 
long-term sustainable economic growth.  It would subsequently fall to 
governments to crystallize these market-based models in more traditional 
regulatory standards.119 
Historically, of course, agencies like Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and 
Fitch have provided company-specific single-score alphanumeric credit 
ratings to the market, allowing investors to evaluate in a comparable, 
consistent and comprehensive manner the market value of proffered debt.  
These companies use similar methods of assessment to come to their 
scores, matched by some of the more recent market entrants that offer 
specialized ratings on, for example, the nature and quality of corporate 
governance.  As is well-appreciated, however, the mainstream ratings 
companies have not fared well in the aftermath of the 1990s tech bubble 
and the more recent subprime global credit crisis.  Their methods of 
assessment and calibration of underlying credit risks have been subject to 
harsh criticism.120  Mainstream rating companies have remained aloof from 
have not set industry standards. 
 118. See Alexander, supra note 111, at 60-61. 
 119. Presumably the Government will introduce such a standard once the metrics are 
clearer, and the private sector has “test-run” what the standard needs to include (so that 
investment companies can build their metrics in common agreement).  See, for example, 
recent debate (early 2008) in the House of Lords over the Climate Change Bill where a 
proposed amendment would provide “guidance” on company reporting as to greenhouse 
emissions. 
 120. There have been recent discussions in Europe and the U.S. on how to better regulate 
credit rating agencies and their methodologies.  See Trade Union Advisory Comm. to the 
Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Trade Union Advisory Committee, Financialisation 
and the “Sub-Prime” Financial Crisis—Issues for Future Regulation (Sept. 5, 2007) 
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the calibration of CESR related issues, preferring, perhaps, to monitor the 
development of standards and data in this area before acquiring (at some 
time in the future) the market innovators. 
We can distinguish between two generic approaches taken by 
intermediaries in the development of CESR standards and performance 
data.  There are, as noted above, firms that begin with a comprehensive 
array of variables designed to capture the crucial issues relevant to CESR 
factors.  Beginning with company annual reports and websites, these firms 
interview companies to augment their initial assessments.  From there they 
develop qualitative scores to indicate corporate responsiveness to the issues 
as well as their actual performance benchmarked against industry and 
country averages.  The resulting scores across a number of indicators 
relevant to institutional investors rely upon directors’ disclosure and the 
evaluation of collected data.  In effect, these types of intermediaries seek to 
capture current performance against relevant standards and supply to the 
market their assessments of companies’ likely future performance.  For 
example, when assessing companies’ environmental performance, ratings 
firms must determine the relevant issues, the indicator variables, and the 
extent to which the assessed companies could be said to be above or below 
the relevant benchmark.121 
Instead of relying upon corporate disclosure and the willingness of 
corporations to be interviewed and assessed, a new generation of 
intermediaries have sought to develop quantitative estimates of corporate 
CESR ‘liability’ over a range of crucial variables relevant to corporations’ 
long-term financial performance.122  Here, the intention is plain:  to avoid 
the complications and costs involved in site-visits and qualitative ratings by 
building comprehensive and consistent databases on individual firms 
benchmarked against industry averages.  Intermediaries rely heavily upon 
the public disclosure by corporations of their liabilities, augmented by 
stylized models of whole industries.  In effect, these models seek to map 
the nature and scope of industry-specific systems of production and 
distribution being a means of referencing firms according to their relative 
performance.  Based on this procedure, industry analysts can build stories 
of likely long-term environmental performance, innovation, and 
technological change.  Analysts can identify firms that might be included, 
for example, in “best-in-class” sectorally-diverse investment portfolios. 
(proposing issues that should be discussed with regard to the proper reaction by financial 
authorities). 
 121. James Salo, Corporate Governance and Environmental Performance, (Sch. of 
Geography & the Env’t, Oxford Univ., Working Paper No. 05-11, 2005). 
 122. Abagail McWilliams & Donald Siegel, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Financial Performance:  Correlation or Misspecification?, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 603, 
603-604 (2000). 
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Reference to corporate CESR ‘liabilities’ here should be qualified by 
the fact that, in most cases, these quantitative metrics are measuring a 
company’s exposure to financial costs in the event that regulation is 
implemented to price CESR externalities, rather than measuring a 
company’s exposure to financial costs in relation to existing regulated 
liabilities or costs.  In the context of emerging legal regimes to price carbon 
and other environmental outputs from industry, these quantitative metrics 
are helpful in anticipating firms’ future cash flow risks should markets and 
regulations apply more exacting pricing regimes.  However, since these 
projections are long-term, they are inevitably subject to uncertainty about 
both the future regulatory landscape as well as the future CESR 
performance of the firm. 
Nevertheless, these quantitative estimates of companies’ actual and 
disclosed liabilities, and their expected rates of change over time, can be 
very important for analysts seeking to build predictive models of stock 
price movements.123  Equally, quantitative estimates allow for rapid and 
systematic data sorting and comparison.  For example, a single carbon-
estimate may be sufficient for investment analysts to rank-order traded 
firms by industry, by country, and by market indices.  By stripping out the 
judgment associated with qualitative scores, as well as the problems 
sometimes encountered when attempting to understand assessors’ 
judgments and benchmarks, these types of intermediaries supply to the 
market data in much the same form that analysts encounter in their day-to-
day trading.124  These intermediaries are also clearly distinct from social 
activists, whose agenda is differently focused on the roles and 
responsibilities of the firm, and can therefore be distinguished from 
conventional CSR discourse in which the social and environmental 
interests of external stakeholders are a more dominant concern.125 
B. A New Kind of Regulatory Strategy 
The U.K. government’s willingness to stand back and let financial 
intermediaries compete for the development of tools which adequately 
price the market value of CESR information is not only a uniquely 
shareholder-oriented approach to CESR, but also represents a unique type 
 123. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Pensions Law Reform and Environmental Policy:  A 
New Role for Institutional Investors 4(5) J. INT’L. FIN. MARKETS 159, 167 (2002) (discussing 
socially responsible investment). 
 124. See, e.g., Trucost Methodology Overview, http://www.trucost.com// 
howtrucostanalyses.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008) (discussing the Trucost assessment 
methodology, which is one of the most important intermediaries in the London market for 
environmental accounting). 
 125. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 1 (discussing the empirical results of the 
“‘corporate social responsibility’ movement”). 
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of regulatory strategy.  Information-based regulatory strategies are not new 
to the field of corporate social responsibility.  However, it is widely 
contested whether information-based strategies are truly “regulatory” in the 
command and control sense, or closer to a form of new governance in 
which firms (or other market actors) are merely “influenced” but are 
ultimately free to act of their own accord.126  New governance theory 
argues that the CSR movement may more closely represent the latter.  
Under this characterization of the CSR movement, information disclosure 
is often used by corporations as a kind of public relations charade rather 
than a way of regulating corporate behavior.127  New governance theory 
describes a “post-regulatory state” in which corporate behavior is 
transformed through interactions between various actors—other firms 
NGOs, government, and actors.  Therefore, compared to regulatory 
mechanisms like mandatory information disclosure, highly networked 
communities are more influential in changing corporate behavior.128 
Reflexive law theorists, however, adopt a slightly different approach.  
They acknowledge the role of various stakeholders in actively changing 
corporate behavior but argue that verifiable and comprehensive information 
disclosure is crucial to catalyzing this change.  They argue that reliable 
mandatory reporting on, for example, corporate environmental 
performance, is important for stakeholder activism to have any real 
influence.129 
We argue that the corporate disclosure regime within the Companies 
Act is best described as a hybrid policy instrument which combines both 
command and control regulation and market-based mechanisms.130  The 
control mechanism of the regime is the mandatory disclosure 
requirement.131  Although the absence of reporting standards weakens the 
 126. See Karen Yeung, Government By Publicity Management:  Sunlight or Spin, PUB. 
L. 360, 362 (2005) (discussing whether public communication management of government 
information really enhance transparency and accountability).  A recent interesting example 
of this debate is the EU REACH regulation on chemicals production and trade.  In this case, 
the disclosure of information has been a pre-condition to the existence of the market because 
chemicals producers are prevented from entering the market until they have disclosed the 
information on the chemicals’ properties, risks, and methods of safe use, among other pieces 
of information.  See Liz Fisher, The Perfect Storm of REACH:  Charting Regulatory 
Controversy In the Age of Information, Sustainable Development, and Globalization, 11 J. 
RISK RES. 541, 541 (2008). 
 127. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 23 (noting that the corporate social 
responsibility movement “may invite insincerity”). 
 128. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information 
Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH J. INT’L L. 1041, 1057 (2003). 
 129. See Richardson, supra note 123, at 167 (discussing the importance of mandating 
reliable reporting in order for the information to be useful to investors). 
 130. See Yeung, supra note 126, at 362. 
 131. See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION:  LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 126-44 
(1994) (describing mandatory information disclosures). 
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substance of the “command” directed towards firms, the competition 
amongst financial intermediaries in London to interpret the disclosed data 
distinguishes the Companies Act from other disclosure regimes with 
weaker enforcement mechanisms.132  Whereas the effectiveness of some 
mandatory disclosure regimes (for example, product labeling) are limited 
by the ability of informed consumers to accurately interpret the disclosed 
information, the Government has sought to leverage the power of London’s 
finance sector and market-price incentives to guarantee the quantity and 
quality of information to be disclosed.  In this way, the market acts as an 
effective ‘enforcer’ of the disclosure provisions because financial 
intermediaries are closely scrutinizing information and putting pressure on 
firms to make the information reliable and relevant. 
The market-based mechanism used in the disclosure provisions is also 
unusual because the intention behind the provisions, as we have discussed, 
is to enhance shareholders’ understanding of the business risks facing 
quoted stocks and improve competitive market pricing of these stocks.  In 
terms of regulatory theory, this logic relies on consensual regulatory 
theory:  a form of regulation which encourages participants to cooperate 
with each other.  In this case, the company, investors, and financial 
consultants are brought into close contact on the issue of CESR information 
and are encouraged to agree on what information is relevant to the long-
term financial prospects of a particular company.133  This type of regulation 
is therefore different from CSR disclosure regimes where the incentive to 
provide information is usually ethical rather than financial, and where some 
firms may be prone to exaggerate their CSR credentials without any direct 
repercussions.134 
It is important to emphasize, then, that the Companies Act appears to 
move beyond the conventional characteristics of the CSR movement and 
integrates CESR information within a theory of efficient market operation 
rather than simply ethical and social responsibility.  Unlike the CSR 
movement where the role of all stakeholders is prominent, the Government 
has given prominence to investors while simultaneously satisfying the 
interests of the NGOs and social activists.  The goal of financial markets 
under the efficient market hypothesis is for quoted stock prices to fully 
reflect all the information available on the firm.135  Ideally, market prices 
 132. Gordon L. Clark, London in the European Financial Services Industry:  Locational 
Advantage and Product Complementarities, 2 J. ECON GEOGRAPHY 433, 433 (2002). 
 133. See BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
REGULATION:  TEXT AND MATERIALS 316-18 (2007). 
 134. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 57 (noting that the corporate social 
responsibility movement is motivated by ethical concerns). 
 135. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:  A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (discussing the “theoretical and empirical literature on the 
efficient markets model,” which occurs when prices fully reflect available information). 
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respond to new information quickly and accurately once the information is 
disclosed.  However, where markets have not been given the opportunity to 
price financially material information because it has not been made 
available, then financial markets are exposed to the savage shocks such as 
we have seen in the subprime-led global credit crisis, and what we may 
expect to see if the physical consequences of climate change take place as 
predicted. 
The Government’s disclosure regime is an attempt to encourage 
financial intermediaries to price this information accurately and efficiently.  
The regime negotiates a complex balance.  On the one hand, it explicitly 
acknowledges that CESR information is financially material and that it 
needs to be priced in order for markets to be informationally efficient.  On 
the other hand, it acknowledges that, to date, the efficient markets 
hypothesis has failed for two reasons.  First, investors have not had access 
to reliable CESR information.  Second, they have lacked a common metric 
to accurately analyze this information.  Since financial markets have failed 
to price CESR information to date, the Government appears to be 
intervening to assist investors in pricing CESR risks over the long term.  
By developing a complex regulatory regime which gives financial 
intermediaries an incentive to fill this gap, the Government acts as a 
regulator of information disclosure on both environmental and social 
matters, as well as a protector of the integrity of the quoted stock price of 
traded securities.136 
The disclosure regime also addresses the assumption under the 
efficient markets hypothesis that sharp-eyed arbitrageurs are able to rapidly 
move prices after the announcement of market-sensitive information.  
Although this may be true for some types of information (for example, 
mergers and acquisitions, dividend announcements, and so forth), arbitrage 
opportunities are limited in instances where information is expensive to 
acquire, verify, and process.137  The Government has implicitly 
acknowledged that CESR is an example of “expensive” information 
because CESR information has conventionally been of unreliable quality 
and difficult to measure in terms of financial materiality.  The U.K.’s 
disclosure provisions are an attempt to overcome this hurdle because the 
onus is on directors to interpret what information is “essential” to the 
business and to report on trends and factors which are likely to affect the 
 136. See John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, 
62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27, 27-28 (2006) (discussing other reporting factors which diminish the 
integrity of market pricing). 
 137. See Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1B 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1059-60 (George M. Constantinides et al., eds., 
2003) (explaining that substantial costs are associated with the discovery and exploitation of 
mis-pricings, and that returns on such an investment may be almost impossible to predict). 
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future development, performance and position of the business.  In this way, 
the CESR information, which is to be disclosed under the Companies Act, 
is intended to be crucial to a firm’s business operations.138 
The approach under the Companies Act is characteristic of Anglo-
American shareholder capitalism because it empowers small investors and 
“outsiders” who do not share the privileged “insider” relationships that 
stakeholders in continental Europe might enjoy with top-level 
management.139  This approach also empowers small investors in relation 
to institutional investors, since the latter usually have superior data-
processing technology and organizational capacity to digest and analyze 
this information.140  This may be intentional, since institutional investors, 
who own seventy percent of all listed equities in the U.K., have been slow 
to respond to CESR issues.  This may be, in part, explained by the paucity 
of quantifiable metrics to analyze CESR data which has meant that 
institutional investors have been cautious of CESR information.  It remains 
to be seen whether financial intermediaries will be able to develop metrics 
that are sufficiently rigorous for institutional investors to change their tune 
on this issue. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Companies Act disclosure regime 
should be distinguished from other information-based policies because it 
places the obligation to report on directors (through the annual business 
review), rather than on the company at large, as is common in public 
relations-driven CESR.  By pinning disclosure obligations on directors in 
conjunction with amendments to directors’ duties discussed above, the 
Government is demonstrating a prescient understanding of corporate 
behavioral change.  In agreement with reflexive legal theorists, 
Gunningham et al. have argued that the attitudes and style of top-level 
management are highly correlated with firms’ environmental behavior 
compared with other variables such as jurisdiction, size, or annual 
turnover.141  In addition, managers and shareholders can exert greater 
 138. This is another instance in which the disclosure regime under the Companies Act 
(2006) moves beyond conventional CSR drivers, where a company’s CESR activities rarely 
include their “core” activities. 
 139. High levels of information transparency on CESR are also consistent with the EU’s 
strategy of building more integrated and competitive capital markets across Europe.  Under 
a closed market structure a premium is placed on special relationships between ‘insiders’ 
and the firm.  These relationships facilitate the flow of private information, which is fully 
digested before being released to the market.  However, the fair review accounting 
principles of the EU Modernization Directive as discussed are attempts to build greater 
harmonization of markets around transparent and well-informed markets. 
 140. See Qi Chen, Discussion of Which Institutional Investors Trade Based on Private 
Information About Earnings and Returns? 45 J. ACCT. RES. 323, 323 (2007) (discussing 
possible explanations, including varied power levels, for differences between institutions 
that trade on private information and those that do not). 
 141. NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET. AL, SHADES OF GREEN:  BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND 
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change on firm-wide behaviors in the Anglo-American firm, compared 
with NGOs and the public.142  In this respect, the Government’s decision to 
place the business-review reporting obligation on directors may be an 
effective way to engage high-level managers and directors within the firm. 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The premise of this paper is that the modern corporation is both the 
object of investment for the global financial sector and the source of value 
for society.  As the object of investment, the modern corporation is subject 
to the theories and practices of the investment industry being, more often 
than not, just one element amongst many in market-based portfolios.  Its 
“value,” in this respect, is contextual:  it is priced against market 
information concerning its expected value relying upon common metrics 
and comparative market performance.  As such, the modern corporation 
has no intrinsic value—whether investors hold, or do not hold, a 
corporation in their stock portfolios depends upon their overall desired risk-
adjusted rate of return.  We recognize, of course, that this is characteristic 
of Anglo-American economies wherein the financial sector has become 
virtually autonomous from the so-called “real” economy.143  But it is 
increasingly the case for continental European economies, and especially 
their largest traded corporations that seek the benefits of global financial 
markets.144 
At another level, the modern corporation is the principal source of 
value for society.  Obviously, it provides employment and earned income 
as well as tax revenue for governments.  In many countries, its share of 
national income has grown dramatically over the past fifty years—so much 
so that the “partnership” between the state and the corporation, so 
important for post-war politics and policy, has been heavily discounted.  
For many, this is the ‘normal’ state of affairs.  But this has meant that the 
modern corporation carries two rather different sets of expectations:  as the 
means of generating income for distribution through society, and as the 
medium through which social expectations are to be, in part, realized.  We 
noted the tension between these expectations, arguing that the Companies 
ENVIRONMENT 68 (2003). 
 142. Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility:  A 
Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 836 
(2007) (arguing that the varied motives of NGOs and corporations lead to variations in ways 
that each are effective in increasing corporate social responsibility). 
 143. See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISIS 50 
(2007). 
 144. See Rob Bauer et. al, supra  note 3 at 461-65 (arguing that increasing adoption of 
shareholder-friendly Anglo-American corporate practices by continental companies will 
allow European corporate governance to substitute for government regulation). 
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Act was conceived to enhance the global competitiveness of U.K.-listed 
corporations given EU and domestic debate over the proper purpose of the 
corporation with respect to social and environmental standards.  When 
pressed to explain its preference, the U.K. Labor Government favored the 
former over the latter. 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that the Government, market analysts, and 
social activists have joined together in an uneasy alliance to promote 
greater disclosure of information to a broad array of constituents.  The 
disclosure movement has been driven by financial market agents concerned 
to better price, on a comparative basis, one company over others.  This 
claim for the disclosure of market-sensitive information has proven 
extremely powerful, buttressed by theories of market efficiency and related 
notions of market equitability wherein “insiders” and “outsiders” are 
deemed deserving of access to the same information.145  If it appears as an 
unassailable economic good, the disclosure movement is also a means to an 
end wherein the autonomy of corporate executives is brought to account on 
the assumption that disclosure can discipline hubris and a penchant for 
empire-building.146  For continental Europe, of course, the disclosure 
movement is part of a larger process whereby hitherto sheltered national 
champions have been integrated into the global financial community. 
For the EU, concerned about the social responsibility of the modern 
corporation, the interest of financial agents in disclosure has been an 
opportunity to articulate a broad range of items for disclosure while 
advocating standards by which the quantity and quality of information are 
to be judged.  The EU Modernisation Directive sought to combine both in a 
way that would meet the interests of the social partners or stakeholders in 
an expansive definition of corporate responsibility.  The U.K. embraced the 
opportunity to re-write U.K. company law but with a particular flavor 
(captured in our recounting of the parliamentary debate over its passage 
through the House of Lords).  The U.K. Government introduced the 
principle that company directors ought to disclosure market-relevant 
information on the long-term prospects of the firm, including, where 
relevant, reference to social and environmental matters.  This was hardly a 
ringing endorsement of corporate social responsibility; the Government 
sought at every opportunity to narrow the scope of such a requirement to 
that which would be appropriate for market valuation of company 
prospects. 
In effect, the Government passed on the opportunity to embrace 
continental European social democracy.  In doing so, it reinforced its 
 145. See WILHELM & DOWNING, supra note 16, at 107, 137 (providing an analytic 
framework for examining the effects of evolving information technology on financial 
markets). 
 146. See Bauer et al., supra note 3, at 442. 
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apparent commitment to the competitiveness of U.K. financial markets and 
especially London’s place in the global competition for incorporation, 
cross-listing, and international financial transactions.  The Government’s 
reluctance to set reporting standards on certain matters including social and 
environmental issues has prompted rapid growth in market-based solutions 
to these questions.  We have argued that in the absence of government 
reporting standards, financial intermediaries have sought to provide 
measures to the extent that financial agents require consistent, comparative 
and comprehensive metrics for assessing corporate value.  There has been a 
remarkable burst of private investment in metric-making, some of which 
rely upon qualitative judgment, others of which are entirely quantitative in 
the manner made popular by the real-time data streams that flow across the 
trading desks of major financial institutions.  Once again, metric-making 
has advantaged London as one of just a few truly global centers of financial 
innovation.147 
Not surprisingly, metric-making has brought into being remarkable 
coalitions of interest and institutions linking the NGO community with 
banks, venture capital partnerships and pension funds.  If stymied by the 
Chancellor’s repudiation of the OFR, through the Companies Act, the NGO 
community has found a willing audience in segments of the financial 
industry (if not always the corporate sector).  But at this juncture we 
emphasized that metric-making is a supply-side activity—it is all about 
articulating standards and measures of measurement for the investment 
industry on the assumption that the demand for such metrics will follow the 
lead provided by statute.  Whether this will actually occur remains to be 
seen.  The Government has embarked on a remarkable experiment in 
reflexive “regulation,” eschewing political leadership in the hope that the 
social expectations of activists will be taken up through the interests of 
financial agents in pricing the value of major companies. 
However, the interest of pension funds and institutional investors in 
CESR metrics remains cautious given the regulatory history in this area in 
the UK.  We noted, for example, that the UK Labor Government’s 1999 
disclosure policy on ethical pension fund investment was still-born; it 
failed, at a rudimentary level to encourage pension funds and their service 
providers to engage in the issues.  By contrast, the relevant provisions of 
the Companies Act concerning the long-term prospects of firms are likely 
to have far more important affects than the change in regulations to the 
Pensions Act 1995.  In any event, recent research has indicated that many 
pension funds and their trustees have not made real efforts to match their 
investment policies to community expectations as regards social and 
 147. See CLARK, supra note 24, at 170-95 (identifying London as prominent in the 
world’s financial services industries). 
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environmental matters.148  In part, reluctance to engage CESR issues can be 
explained by a narrow interpretation of fiduciary duty that excludes 
reference to anything other than the risk-adjusted rate of return.  Equally, 
we have also shown that many trustees, especially those that are 
experienced, recognize the complex nature of the issues involved and the 
lack of widely-accepted decision-metrics relevant to investment strategy.  
Too often, consideration of CESR issues is event-specific, undercutting the 
strong interest of pension fund trustees in a well-governed investment 
strategy. 
In any event, many private sector pension funds are opposed to these 
types of interventions in all but the most obvious cases.  This is for two 
reasons.  First, private sector pension fund boards typically include senior 
executives whose principal concerns are their own status and promotion in 
the company (most important) and the solvency of the fund in relation to 
corporate revenue and growth (very important).  In the U.K., many funds 
are staffed by “secretaries” who are company employees; deliberation over 
investment strategy is often truncated and reliant upon consultants.  In 
effect, private pension funds have neither the interest nor the capacity to 
engage with the issues.  At best, pension fund boards are likely to follow 
the lead on social and environmental matters provided by highly reputable 
investment houses whose investment products integrate these matters into 
the expected pricing of offered portfolios.  Alternatively, a demonstrated 
link between risk and return and environmental liabilities and management 
capacity may attract the interest of boards; at the margin, unless held by 
government to account for such decisions, pension boards may simply 
ignore the issues. 
By our interpretation, the U.K. Companies Act 2006 provides a 
political recipe for reconciling two competing interests in the value of the 
modern corporation.  Where the Government might have required certain 
reporting standards and where it might have introduced mandatory 
disclosure on significant social and environmental concerns, the 
Government sought to enhance the competitiveness of London’s financial 
markets in relation to Frankfurt and Wall Street.  In this respect, the 
Government underwrote the prospects for market-intermediation rather 
than directly regulating corporate social and environmental responsibility. 
We have already witnessed the devastating effect which poor disclosure 
regulation can have of global capital markets in the form of the subprime 
global credit crisis.  Let us hope that the strategy embedded in the UK 
 148. See Emiko Caerlewy-Smith et al., Agitation, Resistance, and Reconciliation with 
Respect to Socially Responsible Investment:  The Attitudes of UK Pension Trustees and 
Oxford Undergraduates, 38 ENV’T & PLANNING 1585, 1585 (2006) (illustrating an example 
of divergence between pension-fund managers’ policies and the expectations of a 
community they serve). 
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Companies Act will assist in mitigating similar shocks in the future. 
 
